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I will begin my presentation by talking about cyber attacks 
generally and give you some data about its extent.  It is mostly bad 
news, but I’ll talk about just how bad the news is.  I will talk a little 
bit about the reasons for this and the vulnerabilities in computer 
systems, how cyber protestors are using the Internet in attacks, 
how terrorists are using the Internet and finally talk about cyber 
terrorism. 
 
Here is some of the bad news: since 1989, the Computer 
Emergency Response Team Coordination Center (CERT/CC) at 
Carnegie-Mellon University has been compiling data on reported 
incidents of attacks on the Internet.  In the last couple of years, the 
number of attacks has skyrocketed, approximately doubling in the 
last year.  My understanding is that already in the first quarter of 
this year, they have received reports of half the number of last 
year’s attacks, so we should see another doubling this year.  There 
were a total of 50,000 last year and each one of those incidents can 
correspond to an attack that infects thousands or hundreds of thou-
sands computers.  Of course, not all incidents are reported to 
CERT, so that’s probably just a small fraction of all attacks. 
 
A firm called Riptech, which provides managed security 
services, collected data over a six-month period for three hundred 
clients in twenty-five countries.  They looked at different levels of 
attack, from what are called “informational attacks,” which is 
really people just scanning the Internet looking to see if particular 
systems are vulnerable but not actually attacking, up to more seri-
ous types of attack, including emergencies in which a security 
breach occurred.  Their data showed that almost 40% of the attacks 
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were targeted at a specific organization or company network.  So 
it’s not just kids out there attacking whatever they can; a lot of 
people are trying to attack very specific places.  Riptech’s data also 
show that the intensity of the attacks is increasing, and contrary to 
some reports, the intensity of attacks did not go down after Sep-
tember 11.   
 
Emergencies, where a security breach had occurred and 
someone had gotten into the network, were experienced by about 
12% of companies. Everybody had the informational kind of attack 
against them, and almost everybody had warnings, in which an at-
tack bypassed the firewall but did not compromise the system.  The 
majority of the attacks came from persons in the United States, fol-
lowed by South Korea, China, Germany and France.  As for the 
sources of attacks per capita, Israel was the largest source, fol-
lowed by Hong Kong, Thailand, South Korea, France and Turkey.  
China doesn’t even show up here. 
 
There is a lot of concern about serious attacks against criti-
cal infrastructures. Riptech reported that severe attacks were di-
rected chiefly at the power and energy industries and the financial 
services industries, both critical infrastructures.  The high tech in-
dustry follows after that.  If you look at attacks from the Middle 
East, by industry, the power and energy industries are again the 
most targeted.  Financial services are still high, but further down.  
Since these attacks come from the Middle East, and Israel is a ma-
jor source of Internet attacks, this could represent attacks from per-
sons in Israel. 
 
The rate of viral infections of e-mails is going up.  In 1999, 
a virus infected one in 1,400 e-mails; in 2001 it is 1 in 300 e-mails.  
This data comes from an anti-virus company, which scanned their 
clients’ e-mail.  They projected that by the year 2015, 3 out of 4 e-
mails will have a virus.  That is actually very conservative, given 
the sharp increase that we are seeing.  The rate of viral infections 
of computers is also rising.  In 1996, about 10 out of 1,000 com-
puters were infected; last year it was a little over 100 out of 1,000 
computers, or about 10%. 
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It doesn’t take a lot of skill to launch viral attacks.  You can 
download free software programs from the Internet that create a 
virus for you: you run the program, fill in a couple of boxes and 
you’ve produced a virus.  That’s why there are so many viruses – it 
is that easy.  A common type of virus, called a worm, is sent as an 
attachment to an e-mail; when you open the attachment, it e-mails 
itself to everybody on your Outlook e-mail address book.  There 
are similarly easy tools for other kinds of attacks.  The Code Red 
worm was one of the costliest viruses, though not the costliest (the 
costliest was the I Love You virus).  The losses caused by the Code 
Red worm were estimated to be $2.4 billion.  It spread quickly 
across the Internet and ended up infecting 359,000 hosts or com-
puters in a 13-hour period.  If you think 13 hours is fast, you can 
devise a worm with a little more intelligence that will spread in 
fifteen minutes to an hour.  If you get even smarter, you can have a 
“flash worm” that will hit everything in 30 seconds.   
 
The Code Red worm doesn’t spread through e-mail; it just 
attacks computers, basically mimicking and automating what a 
hacker would do.  If an infected computer is run, it will scan the 
Internet for vulnerable computers, and when it finds one, it copies 
itself onto that computer.  Once it’s on the next computer, it again 
scans for vulnerable computers and copies itself, and so on.  The 
way a flash worm could spread so much faster is by scanning the 
entire Internet in advance to identify all the vulnerable computers; 
the worm would make a list of these machines and as it spreads, it 
would give part of that list to the next computer down the chain to 
attack.   So there is no wasted effort during the attack phase of 
scanning for things that aren’t vulnerable or that have already been 
attacked.   
 
Another form of attack is the web defacement.  Again, we 
have seen a dramatic increase in this in the last couple of years.  
Denial of service (DOS) attacks are increasing as well.  The San 
Diego Supercomputing Center estimated about 4,000 of these DOS 
attacks take place a week.  Most of them last less than an hour but 
a couple percent of them went on for more than a day. 
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Why are there so many attacks?  As the Internet has grown, 
there are more people out there to attack and more sites that are 
potential victims.  But it also has a lot to do with the complexity of 
the systems that are running on these computers.  The software has 
known vulnerabilities and more vulnerabilities are continually be-
ing discovered.  The attackers are getting increasingly powerful 
tools and the attacks are easy to perform and have low risk.  If you 
just deface web sites, the chances that anyone will even try to track 
you down and arrest you are just about nil, because the damages 
aren’t that high most of the time. 
 
One big reason for the increase in the number of attacks is 
the number of vulnerabilities in the systems.  Microsoft, Linux and 
others all have vulnerabilities.  Because Microsoft is used the most, 
you hear more about it and hackers are more inclined to try to 
break that system.  Vulnerabilities can also appear in the way the 
system administrators install and operate the software.  In addition, 
user practices create vulnerabilities.  Bad passwords are still a ma-
jor plague on the Internet.  A surprising number of people haven’t 
even changed the default passwords they were initially issued, so 
the hacker knows the default password.  Most attacks exploit 
known vulnerabilities that could be fixed by the operators of the 
systems.  The fixes are available from the vendors, but they ha-
ven’t been installed. 
 
The number of vulnerabilities reported to CERT has been 
going up dramatically in the last couple years and has now reached 
2,500 over the space of year, which is about seven a day.  If you’re 
a network administrator managing a large network for a corpora-
tion and you have seven vulnerabilities a day that affect systems 
across your network, it’s a major job to try to handle them, because 
just patching the patches can cause problems.  It’s not always 
straightforward. 
 
A lot of the attacks taking place on the Internet are not car-
ried out by activists or terrorists; they are carried out by kids hav-
ing fun or by organized criminal groups, which steal credit card 
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numbers, access banking and financial systems, perform bogus fi-
nancial transactions, and all kinds of things.  Extortion is also hap-
pening more and more often, particularly against financial institu-
tions.  The attackers get in, get access to credit card numbers or 
other financial data, and then they threaten to expose the compa-
nies or put the sensitive data onto the Internet if the company 
doesn’t pay up.  In fact, some do.   
 
Cyber protests have become increasingly common. As con-
flicts take place in the real world, like those in the Mideast, Kos-
ovo or Kashmir, the spy plane incident with China and so forth, 
hackers start their own forms of protest, sometimes attacking each 
other, sometimes, probably more often, attacking government sites 
in other countries, e-commerce sites or any site they can get access 
to.  
 
A year ago in October, a Mideast cyber war erupted; it’s 
still going on to some extent, but at a much lower level.  In January 
after the first few months of the cyber war, a local company, iDe-
fense, put out a report listing some of the people who are involved 
in it, the number of attacks and other data.  The pro-Palestinian at-
tackers were primarily targeting commercial sites in Israel and also 
in the United States.  The pro-Israeli attackers were primarily tar-
geting websites that supported terrorist organizations, particularly 
Hamas and Hezbollah.  The pro-Palestinian hackers included Unity 
and al-Muhajiroun, a London-based group with ties to al-Qaeda. 
 
The Institute for Security Studies at Dartmouth has a major 
program on cybersecurity and cyber threats.  They looked at con-
flicts taking place in the physical world to see how they correlated 
with cyber attacks, and they found a pretty good correlation with 
some of the events.  
             
There is a hacking group based in the UK called the Elec-
trohippies, which has organized several kinds of cyber protest 
events in the last few years.  A few weeks ago, they announced an 
action against the Israeli government because of Sharon’s policies 
and actions.  You can participate in this protest, which is a kind of 
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denial-of-service attack called a web sit-in.  This involves clicking 
through various sections of their site, which causes your computer 
to start generating a lot of requests to the targeted Israeli govern-
ment websites.  This produces a lot of traffic against those websites 
which clogs them up so legitimate traffic can’t get to the website.  
It doesn’t really shut down the websites but it slows them down to 
the point that they’re not very useful.  This started on April 15 and 
I think it is still going on. 
 
After September 11, people in cyberspace either tried to 
express their support for bin Laden or more commonly, people an-
gered by the events of September 11 targeted whatever they could 
in Afghanistan or neighboring areas.  Pro-bin Laden groups, such 
as the al-Qaeda Alliance Online, appeared.  These groups were 
also involved in the Mideast cyberwar and also in cyberspace 
skirmishes over Kashmir.  G-Force Pakistan, the hacking group 
that founded al-Qaeda Alliance Online, carried out several web 
defacements.  Their defacements stated that they condemned the 
events of September 11 but at the same time supported bin Laden 
and what he stood for.  The hackers also listed their demands.  
Some of their defacements included photos and professional qual-
ity graphics. 
 
Various groups also appeared on the anti-terrorist side.  
One group calling themselves Young Intelligent Hackers Against 
Terrorism (YIHAT) said they were out to disrupt the money 
sources for terrorism.  They claimed that they had broken into two 
banks in the Middle East that had accounts for bin Laden.  The 
banks denied it.  The YIHAT website asked corporate America to 
donate their computers to the hackers so that they could use them 
for cyber attack training, much as al-Qaeda had used the Afghan 
training camps for terrorist training. 
 
    Other anti-terrorist hackers defaced websites supporting 
the Taliban.  Prior to September 11, there were a several sites sup-
porting bin Laden and the Taliban; after September 11, they disap-
peared as fast as they come up.   
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Some of the defacements were kind of funny.  One of my 
favorites was a hacker called “Fluffi Bunni”, who put the image of 
a little stuffed bunny on his web defacements.  One defacement 
reads, “If you want to see the Internet again, give us Mr. Bin Laden 
and $5 million in a brown paper bag.  Love, Fluffi B.” 
 
A rather large group led by a hacker called “Hacka Jak” 
from Ohio also targeted websites affiliated with the terrorists.  
They were one of the first groups out there after September 11 to 
conduct attacks.  The security community pleaded with them not to 
do this, and there was a press story about this.  I was interviewed 
for it, so my name appeared in the story.  So “Hacka Jak” e-mailed 
me and said we shouldn’t be telling him what to do, but lo and be-
hold, this group stopped defacing websites right after that.  
 
Like everybody else, terrorists are using information tech-
nology, particularly the Internet.  We have seen since September 
11 how the hijackers had used e-mail and instant messaging, and 
had browsed the web to find information about crop dusters and 
various other things.  They also used some information hiding 
tools so they would be harder to track on the Internet.  The Cana-
dian government reported that al-Qaeda was using the Web to 
search for information about critical infrastructures, in particular 
management systems like the SCADA system, which provides 
control on day-to-day acquisitions and things like that.  The Aum 
Shinryko group – they are the ones who carried out a poison gas 
attack on the Tokyo subway – set up a software development 
branch and a year or two ago, the Japanese police discovered that 
this group had written software the police were using.  The group 
was under contract to develop systems for ten government agen-
cies and something like eighty commercial firms.   
 
The Hezbollah website has an English version of their web-
site but a lot of terrorist groups’ sites are not in English and you 
need to able to be able to read the original language they are in.  
Some of them have areas on their website that are inaccessible to 
the causal user, because they are password controlled. 
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Guido Rudolphi, a computer specialist in Switzerland, was 
researching how al-Qaeda used the Internet and he found a website 
run by a man named Ould Slahi, who was tied to the Millenium 
bomb plot against LAX and also to September 11.  He was also 
operating an Internet café.   Slahi’s website has a guest book that 
was being used by al-Qaeda operatives to communicate with each 
other.  Rudolphi was tracking activity on that Website and evi-
dently the number of people going to that website and posting 
messages went up dramatically right before September 11. 
 
I mentioned that many terrorists are using information hid-
ing tools.  There have been a few cases reported where encryption 
has been used to hide communications.  The Aum Shinryko cult, 
again, was pretty good with computers and they had all their files 
stores stored under encryption. 
 
Government officials have been able to break the encryp-
tion in many terrorist cases because the quality of the encryption 
wasn’t very good, basically export grade type encryption.  Back 
around 1996, a lot of the people who opposed export controls on 
encryption argued that the bad guys wouldn’t be dumb enough to 
use commercial encryption exported from the United States.  Folks 
like me said: “Well, logically that’s true, but in practice, it hap-
pens.”  And in fact, it did.   I am not trying to argue that we should 
prohibit exporting encryption programs, but it didn’t work out the 
way people thought it would. 
 
There has been speculation that terrorists are hiding mes-
sages in images posted on the Internet.  I know one computer sci-
entist who very closely watched a website that supported bin 
Laden.  He examined the images and found that the images looked 
the same if you looked at them from one day to the next, but if you 
actually looked at the binary code, the bits that make up those im-
age files, they were changing from day to day.  He was never able 
to crack it but he suspected that there were messages hidden inside 
the images.   
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There have been very few cyber attacks committed by peo-
ple who are known terrorists.  There is the case of a terrorist who 
approached a hacker in 1998 to buy software that had been taken 
off a Department of Defense computer system, which the hacker 
claimed could be used to control DOD networks.  It was an over-
statement of what the software could do but it was nevertheless 
interesting that somebody tried to buy that program.  In another 
case, IRA hackers broke into British government computers but the 
purpose there was not to cause destruction but just to collect intel-
ligence and use that in physical attacks.  There was an attack 
against the Sri Lankan embassies’ computer systems several years 
ago.  The attackers swamped the embassies with e-mail messages – 
these are called e-mail bombs.  Eight hundred e-mails a day for 
two weeks was a lot back then.  This was more a cyber protest than 
a terrorist attack.   
 
There were reports of al-Qaeda making cyber threats.  A 
suspected member of al-Qaeda claimed that they had programmers 
working for Microsoft who had planted Trojan horses in Microsoft 
code.  If in fact they did that, it would have very serious implica-
tions: there would be back doors in the Windows program that 
could then be exploited sometime down the road.  It is very 
unlikely that that occurred, but it’s important that it is on their ra-
dar screen.  It suggests al-Qaeda understands the potential of a cy-
ber attack.   
 
I have left cyber terrorism for the end because I don’t think 
it exists yet, so we are really talking about something that is hypo-
thetical.  The Department of Defense defines terrorism as “The 
calculated use of unlawful violence or the threat of unlawful vio-
lence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or to intimidate govern-
ments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally politi-
cal, religious or ideological.”  In regard to cyber terrorism, you can 
translate this two ways.  One is to substitute cyber attacks for vio-
lence.  This waters down the definition; it may not really generate 
fear and probably won’t have the same kind of emotional impact.  
We can also change the definition by saying that the me thod will 
involve some kind of cyber attack.  As an example, terrorists might 
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somehow access the air traffic control systems and alter the flight 
paths and cause planes to crash.  That would have catastrophic 
consequences in the same way that a physical attack would.  An-
other kind of attack might be something that isn’t necessarily 
catastrophic, but causes major problems on the stock market or af-
fects the financial community in some way so as to generate a 
similar level of fear.   
 
The best work on cyber terrorism has been done by the 
Center for the Study of Terrorism and Irregular Warfare (CSTIW) 
at the Naval Postgraduate School.  They produced a report in 1999 
that assessed the prospects of terrorist groups pursuing cyber 
methods.  They concluded that the barrier for entry was actually 
fairly high, aside from the kind of skirmishes that we see the hack-
ers doing now.  Terrorists generally lack the wherewithal, includ-
ing human capital.  The NPS study looked at different levels of 
cyber terror capability, from very simple hacks, like you see taking 
place now, which don’t really require any skill at all, up to more 
sophisticated kinds of attacks that might take several years to de-
velop. 
 
They concluded that religious groups were the most likely 
to seek the most advanced capabilities, consistent with the indis-
criminate use of violence.    Ethno-nationalist, separatist and revo-
lutionary groups are also likely to seek advanced, structured capa-
bilities.  So far the New Age groups like the animal rights activists 
are just engaging in cyber protests and disruption. 
 
In May 2000, the CSTIW held a conference to assess 
whether or not sub-state groups engaged in armed resistance would 
pursue cyber terrorism.  They invited some practitioners from 
those groups to participate in the workshop: two from the Basque 
separatist movement, one each from the PLO, the Tamil Tigers, 
and the Columbian revolutionary group FARC, one hacker, eleven 
academics and one UN representative. 
 
  They originally scheduled a second conference the week 
of September 11 to look at religious groups.  I had been invited to 
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participate but I couldn’t because of a conflict.  After September 
11, I learned they had cancelled it earlier.  
 
In the meeting they held the year before, they developed a 
simulation based on the situation in Chechnya.   In that simulation, 
the group representing the Chechen resistance had advocated doing 
only one kind of cyber attack, namely some kind of disruption that 
would affect the Russian stock market.  They decided not to do 
more than that was because they didn’t want to do something that 
would impact the average Russian, whereas an attack on the Rus-
sian stock exchange would only affect the elite.  The conclusions 
from that study were consistent with the conclusions from their 
earlier work. 
 
My conclusions are very similar: the Internet is very vul-
nerable to serious attack.  There is no question about it.  Whether it 
will be terrorists who attack it, I am not so sure, but I think we will 
continue to see a lot of hacking and attacks by organized crime 
where there is the possibility of a big payoff.  Down the road, there 
is potential for terrorists engaging more in cyber attacks.  A lot of 
the attacks that have been postulated would be a lot more difficult 
to pull off than you might be led to believe from reading reports in 
the press.   
 
One of the most serious incidents took place in Australia a 
year or two ago, where a man was able to hack into the sewage 
control system and reverse the flows of sewage, which harmed the 
environment and killed wildlife.  He didn’t have any social or po-
litical agenda; he was mad because he had been turned down for a 
job with the county that operated the sewage system.  This was his 
revenge.  He was able to pull this off because he had worked for 
the company that wrote the software and had taken it home when 
he left the company.  He had knowledge and tools that not any-
body could have obtained.  Furthermore, it took him forty-six tries 
to get it.  This is good news in a way:  interfering with the system 
wasn’t that easy even for somebody who had the software and 
knew what to do.  It gives an indication, I think, that a serious at-
tack can’t be done just by anybody; it really requires some inside 
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knowledge.  On the other hand, insiders can be bought.  We have 
had plenty of spies in this country who have sold information to 
foreign governments.  We can’t assume that people who are work-
ing in the areas of critical infrastructures might not turn on them in 
some way that would lead to a major attack. 
 




Question & Answer Period 
 
Question: How effective are off the shelf security systems, like the 
Norton anti-virus program?  
 
Denning: I think most of the major products are very good.  I use 
Norton myself.  You do have to keep them up to date because vi-
ruses are continually evolving, not by themselves, but because at-
tackers write new viruses that the anti-virus program won’t detect.  
My approach has been not to use Outlook for my e-mail.  I don’t 
use Internet Explorer; I use Netscape.  I don’t know if that has 
made me less vulnerable or not.  My husband uses a Macintosh, 
and that will also prevent a lot of attacks. 
 
Question: Are the critical industries, the financial services and en-
ergy and power, investing enough to significantly reduce their vul-
nerabilities? 
 
Denning: I can’t answer whether they are investing enough.  I 
know they certainly pay more attention to it now than they have in 
the past and there’s definitely increased awareness of it. 
 
Question: You mentioned the issue of state-sponsored terrorism.  I 
agree with your points about the difficulty for individual people to 
accomplish much beyond the ankle biting, nuisance kind of attack.  
On the other hand, state-sponsored hackers would be bringing a lot 
more resources to bear, particularly in compromising insiders, and 
the insider threat is really the key one.  If we thought that security 
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classification systems and getting security clearances was tough 
before, there’s a whole new dimension of clearance and back-
ground checks that are going to need to be done for a new class of 
people.  But there are countries that are able to do this.  I would 
think it would be in their interest to penetrate but not necessarily 
do anything, just so they know where to go when they decide they 
want to, at the right time.  Do you have any general thoughts about 
state-sponsored terrorism? 
 
Denning: We certainly know that some of the major states are 
looking at cyber methods.  Certainly China is one; Russia is an-
other one.  I have heard that Iraq is looking at these things. 
 
Question: And maybe the United States. 
 
Denning: The United States has been looking at it for years, abso-
lutely.  None of this is surprising; any country that is not looking at 
it would be asleep at the wheel.  You have to understand and study 
the attacks if you want to defend against them.  And you might 
want to launch an attack.  In terms of state-sponsored terrorism, I 
don’t worry about China on that.  They have good reasons not to 
want to interfere with the West’s infrastructure, which would have 
global impact.  If you disrupt the stock exchange in the United 
States, it will affect stocks worldwide.  If you shut down electricity 
across the United States, the stock market is going to go down, 
business will come to a halt, and that will have global implications.  
So to me, any country would be crazy to do something that would 
have a major impact on infrastructure.  But that doesn’t mean that 
a terrorist group, or a country that feels like it has nothing to lose 
globally by causing that kind of major disruption, won’t. 
 
Question:  If you connected to an Internet provider through a mo-
dem, they can’t attack you, unless you’re actually connected, isn’t 
that right? 
 




Question: Most ordinary computer users don’t know anything 
about firewalls and don’t have them.  And if they have an anti-
virus program, they probably don’t keep it up to date.  There’s a lot 
of vulnerability out there.  Couldn’t Microsoft and the other com-
panies put something in that would help in this regard?  That ought 
to be part of the operating system in some way, or at least a system 
to alert you if you’re being attacked. 
 
Denning: Many of the attacks are hitting at the application layer 
there, so you can’t put it all in the operating system.  Microsoft is 
in a bad position because the more they do, the more people say 
they are taking over the market.  There is a good business now in 
the anti-viral business by itself.   
Somebody suggested that it should be illegal to operate a 
computer without keeping your anti-viral tools up to date.  If your 
computer spreads a virus and your anti-viral tools weren’t up to 
date, you could be perhaps fined or found guilty of a misdemeanor.  
I don’t like that idea, mainly because I don’t always update mine 
every two weeks.  If I do good hygiene on my computer, nobody is 
going to infect it; I can defend myself against other people’s vi-
ruses.  Should you need a license, like a driver’s license, to operate 
a computer on the Internet?  In this case, you would need to renew 
it, not once every three years or five years, but every two weeks or 
month to show that your computer is safe. 
 
Question: One of the initiatives that’s been kicked around lately is 
to have the government take a more active role with industry to 
alert people and get them to report attacks to the government, to try 
to get a coordinated alert system.  Do you think that would be ef-
fective? 
 
Denning: I think it is a great idea.  The FBI now says they have 
over 4,000 members in their InfraGard program, which is set up 
with all the field offices.  Industry itself has set up Information 
Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) for reporting within the in-
dustry and these all seem like great steps forward to address the 
problems.  But you need anonymity in the reporting or companies 
won’t report.  The FBI says that people can make anonymous re-
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ports and then that information can be shared with other members 
anonymously.  The FBI also says that they can protect corporate 
information from the Freedom of Information Act.  A lot of corpo-
rations aren’t convinced of that and so there has been some effort 
made to get that explicitly stated in law.  The FBI says that they 
can do it. 
 
Question: I agree with your assessment that terrorists are less likely 
to use cyber terrorism as a tool.  Two years ago the Denial-of-
Service attacks on Yahoo and the e-commerce sites were described 
as ”cyber terrorism.”  That was a cruel, malicious event, but we 
need a better term than cyber terrorism.  I don’t know what the 
word is. 
 
Denning: I would call this kind of attack “cyber vandalism.” 
 
Question: We had a discussion at the National Defense University 
right after 9/11 and we concluded that they could have taken down 
the communication infrastructure by interfering with the FAA sys-
tem.  The FAA system is secure for patrolling aircraft, but if you 
take down the communication structure that the FAA system de-
pends on, you could make people afraid of secondary and tertiary 
attacks, because they would not know if all the aircraft were 
brought down.  The Pentagon was evacuated three additional times 
because we didn’t know if something else was coming in.  They 
missed the opportunity to make their attack even worse by simul-
taneously launching this kind of attack. 
 
Denning: But that would have been much, much harder. 
 
Question: They did a great deal of planning for that single event.  
Considering the amount of time they had in planning that one 
event, they missed the opportunity.  I really don’t think they under-
stood that.  We may be helping to educate them with this kind of 
discussion. 
 
Denning: I don’t know how they would get the education to do 
that.  You can see how they got the education to fly the airplanes; 
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anybody can do that.  But where would you get the knowledge to 
take down the FAA’s communication system? 
 
Question:  Look at the areas they might target, such as, computer 
science.  How many students in this field are US citizens?  Are we 
training the next wave of terrorists in our universities?  They won’t 
be using hacker tools available over the website.  They are actually 
studying the systems, identifying vulnerabilities.  The “Code Red” 
virus was very disruptive but there was no payload associated with 
it.  If it had a destructive payload, it could have taken down the 
Net.  “Code Red #2” was another test firing of a missile, but still 
had no payload.  The next missile may have a payload. 
 
Denning: Yes, it could, but it wouldn’t have had as much impact, 
because it would have knocked itself out.  “Code Red” spreads by 
attacking other computers; if it kills off its host, it can’t do that.  It 
might carry out five attacks and then kill off the host, but then it’s 
not going to spread as fast.  People have postulated a lot of smarter 
ways of carrying out attacks: you could infect the hosts with a vi-
rus that includes a time bomb which is hidden in the system some-
place and goes off on a specific day. 
 
Question: Do you have any ideas about what sort of research needs 
to be done or what actions need to be done to protect against future 
cyber terror attacks? 
 
Denning: That is almost unlimited.  We always need new and bet-
ter defenses methods because the hackers are creating new and bet-
ter attacks.  One of the things that we need is empirical data to de-
fine good security practices.  Right now, security is pretty ad hoc.  
A lot of the reason why corporations haven’t been quick to tighten 
security on their networks is there hasn’t been an economic case 
made to do it.  Nobody has shown that if you follow a specific plan 
of action, you will get a specific return on your investment and 
protection against loss.  It’s difficult for a company to know how 
much money to spend, which products to buy, and how much they 
will save by doing that.  A lot of work has to be done to establish 
 17 
empirically grounded best practices and what we need to do to pro-





   
